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INTRODUCTION

Governments, like private citizens, are faced with the problem of apportioning
scarce resources among almost insatiable and competing demands. This fact has
led students of government finance to advance the principle of "maximum social
advantage," which holds that since resources are limited, they must be allocated
among alternative ends in such a way as to yield maximum satisfaction to the members of society. Actually, the principle requires that decision-makers seek answers
to two questions in connection with each expenditure proposal. First, it must be
asked whether the social benefit derived from a governmental expenditure is greater
or less than the aggregate personal benefit which the taxpayers would have derived
from the private use of these funds. If greater, according to the principle, the government expenditure is justified; if less, it is not warranted. And second, assuming
an expenditure is to be made, it must be asked whether the social advantage is
greater if the money is spent on activity A or on activity B. Thus, the principle
requires not only the comparison of alternative expenditures, but a decision as to
whether any public expenditure is warranted in light of the sacrifices that taxpayers
will be asked to make.
This consideration of alternative uses of limited resources constitutes the heart of
the budget process. No doubt, budget-makers at lower echelons of the bureaucracy
are not particularly aware of the weighing and evaluating which form a part of their
jobs; these processes are done almost subconsciously where policies are well established and the sums involved are small. But budget-makers high in the departments
or close to the President and in Congress are very much aware of their role when
they compare the relative merits of competing proposals, especially when the programs are large and the stakes are high. In making their decisions, budget-makers
are invariably influenced by a variety of factors. The official's own conception of the
public welfare may lead him to favor one use over another; yet, his bias may be modified by what he knows the President or Congress or interest groups may insist upon.
Thus, the final decision is the product of diverse values and pressures so complex
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in their interrelations that no person may be entirely certain why a particular decision
was made.
Because of the importance and complexity of the decision-making process, of
which budgeting is an example, students of the behavioral sciences have devoted
increasing attention to it in recent years. Students of government have, in particular,
been concerned with increasing the rationality of the budget process, in the sense of
maximizing the extent to which budget choices are made explicitly and deliberately.
In this effort, public administration has sought to develop organizational arrangements
and administrative procedures which facilitate the clear formulation and comparison
of alternatives; and economics has sought to provide methods of analysis which
reveal with increasing clarity the comparative utility of alternative expenditures.
Perhaps the most important contribution of the economists has been to focus
attention on the fact that it is not profitable to discuss in the aggregate whether schools,
for example, are "more important" than roads. The question that rather needs to be
asked is whether the return will be greater from an incremental investment in schools
or an equal investment in roads. If one million dollars is available, in which function
should it be invested? The answer is found by looking at the marginal social benefit yielded by each of the functions. This is the concept which lies at the heart of
marginal analysis as it is used by economists.
So stated, the problem of budgeting takes on a deceptive simplicity. Budgetmakers may attempt broad appraisals and independent judgments, but characteristically they find that not one, but numerous values need to be maximized and
that these values more often than not conflict. Especially is this true of river basin
development, where short and long-range goals and the competing demands of flood
control, navigation, irrigation, and power development make conflict inevitable. But
this is by no means the only problem. The comparison of utilities is made all the
more difficult by the fact that value judgments cannot ordinarily be given quantitative
expression and, in any event, cannot be compared with one another in terms of a
common unit of value. Were it possible to reduce a variety of conflicting goals to
a common unit of value, it would be possible, of course, to rank alternatives according to their comparative utility. But the depressing fact is that neither the Benthamite
calculus nor any other system sufficiently lends itself to quantification to eliminate the
need for intuition or other subjective mental processes.
Despite these qualifications, considerable progress has been made in recent years
in the elaboration of forms of economic analysis which, when properly used, provide
decision-makers with a quantified appraisal of the relative merits of alternative water
development projects. While the misuse of economic analysis has been common
in appraising these projects, it seems fair to say that the true goal of budgeting-the
rational comparison of alternatives-is clearly capable of being achieved in the water
development field.
Of the three agencies which construct river basin projects and employ economic
analysis in their evaluation, the Army Corps of Engineers is the oldest. Although
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the Corps' origins go back to the Revolutionary War, it was not asked to undertake
civil functions until 1824, when Congress directed the Engineers to clear a navigable
channel down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. This was the beginning of the
Corps's function as "engineering consultants and contractors for the Congress." For
nearly a century, the Corps was confined to navigation improvements, although flood
control was often a by-product of its undertakings. Beginning in 1917, however,
Congress permitted the Corps to construct certain flood works on the Mississippi and
Sacramento Rivers, and in the Flood Control Act of 1936,1 it recognized flood
damage as a matter of national concern and authorized the Corps to construct flood
works of all kinds, including reservoirs, throughout the country. Since power was
recognized as a by-product of reservoir construction, the Engineers were, in fact, thus
permitted to enter the business of multiple-purpose river basin development. The
Corps is well known, of course, for the pork-barrel legislation which authorizes its
projects, for its close ties with local and national organizations which effectively
support its program in Congress, and for its ability to circumvent presidential control
The Bureau of Reclamation, established by the Reclamation Act of I9O2,' is the
agency primarily responsible for the construction of public irrigation projects in the
seventeen western states. Created as a logical extension of the homestead concept
into the semiarid and arid West, the reclamation program has always been committed
to the task of creating family-sized farms, which are visualized as supporting, in turn,
numerous small but thriving urban communities. The social idealism of the reclamation program has been buttressed by the acreage and antispeculation provisions of
various reclamation laws and by provisions of other laws which give preference
The
in the sale of power to public and cooperatively-owned distribution systems
social policies of the reclamation program have been both an advantage and a disadvantage to the Bureau in the struggle among competing agencies. The Bureau has
won friends among liberal and idealistic groups, but the restrictive nature of the
legislation under which it operates has made it comparatively difficult for large
landowners to secure windfall gains or for project beneficiaries to escape an obligation to repay at least part of the capital costs of irrigation projects. All things considered, therefore, the Bureau has not had as good public relations as has the Corps,
and its program has never been as generously supported in Congress.
The Flood Control Act of 1936 assigned to the Department of Agriculture responsibility for watershed management designed to prevent flood damage. The
Department was not immediately geared to the implementation of such a program,
apart from its ongoing responsibilities for soil conservation, and World War II super1 49
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vened before the program could be initiated. Hence, it was not until 1946 that Congress actually appropriated the first funds for watershed control. In the decade which
has followed, Agriculture's program has shown no sign of rivaling in size those of the
Corps and the Bureau. The Department of Agriculture has had no well-organized
constituency to support its flood-control work, and the nature of its task lacks the
dramatic quality of harnessing whole rivers with giant multiple-purpose dams. Then,
too, the Corps and the Bureau have done what they could to secure congressional
restrictions of one sort or another on the watershed program. Although Agriculture's
program has remained comparatively small, its plans are big, and if support can be
developed, its program may rival in size those of its two competitors.
II
ECONOMIC EVALUATION

Because of the limitations of funds and the fact that projects in all parts of the
country have their enthusiastic supporters, it has been necessary for Congress and the
construction agencies to develop criteria for evaluating water development projects.
Two general tests-financial feasibility and benefit-cost analysis-have been devised.
When conservatively used, both provide decision-makers with quantitative information which makes it possible to rank projects in the order of their contribution to
the general welfare, at least to the extent that this can be measured by tangible
utilities and disutilities. The rank order is a rough one and must be qualified by our
inability to quantify certain intangible factors (extramarket values) which may make
projects more or less desirable; but these tests, when properly used, are capable of
providing at least a rough guide to decision-makers.
The test of financial feasibility has been applied over the years only to irrigation
projects. The Reclamation Act of 19o2 provided that water users on federal irrigation projects must contract to repay the capital costs of these projects, without interest,
over a period of ten years. The interest subsidy was widely regarded as justified because of the national interest in the social objectives of the program; and in any
event, it was a smaller subsidy than that provided for navigation and later for
flood-control projects, which do not require repayment of capital costs. When the
first settlers proved unable to meet the repayment requirements, Congress extended
the period to twenty years in the Reclamation Extension Act of 1914,' then to forty
years in the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926,' and finally to fifty years in the
Reclamation Project Act of I939. Thus, although the period has gradually lengthened, the test has remained one of the ability of the settlers to reimburse the federal
government for its investment in the project. Repayment ability, in turn, has been
regarded as a measure of the worthwhileness of the project, since it reflects project
costs, the availability of water, the fertility of the soil, and other factors which have
a bearing on the comparative utility of projects.
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While any project meeting the test of financial feasibility might be authorized,
the expectation was-and no doubt the practice has been-that the Bureau would
seek authorization to construct those projects first which would "pay out" in the
least number of years. In this sense, then, the test of financial feasibility provides a
rank order of projects. In practice, of course, political and other factors have played
an important role in determining the order in which projects are constructed, but this
fact does not vitiate the statement that calculations of financial feasibility can provide
decision-makers with valuable information which has the effect of sharpening alternatives and providing a more rational basis for reaching conclusions.
Benefit-cost analysis is perhaps a better test of the worthwhileness of a project,
since it can be used to measure a wider range of factors than does financial feasibility.
The use of benefit-cost analysis grew out of section i of the Flood Control Act of
1936, which provided that:?
.. . the Federal Government should improve or participate in the improvement of
navigable waters or their tributaries, including watersheds thereof, for flood-control purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs, and
if the lives and social security of people are otherwise adversely affected.
Although the act applied specifically only to the Corps of Engineers and the
Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Reclamation found it expedient to join
with the other agencies in efforts to elaborate a system of project evaluation which
would meet the act's requirements. Benefit-cost analysis was the result
In this
form of economic evaluation, two categories of benefits and costs are recognized:
(i) tangible benefits and costs, which are susceptible of measurement in monetary
terms; and (2) intangible benefits and costs (extramarket yalues), which cannot be
converted to monetary equivalents. Almost necessarily, this form of evaluation places
greater emphasis upon tangible benefits and costs, although the intangibles are not
necessarily ignored. Customarily, tangible benefits and costs are reduced to dollar
equivalents and expressed as a ratio of benefits to costs. If this ratio is in excess of
unity, it is generally considered that the project is economically justified. Intangibles
are compared qualitatively in prose form and, on the whole, play a rather unimportant role, at least in a formal sense, in project justification.
In the calculation of benefit-cost ratios, economists recognize two types of tangible
benefits and costs-primary (direct) and secondary (indirect). Primary benefits
8 49
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and costs are those that arise directly and immediately from the projects. Primary
benefits include reduction of flood damage, increases in net income resulting from
the higher use of property made possible by flood control, increases in net income
from lands benefited by watershed treatment measures or rendered more productive
by irrigation, savings in transportation costs resulting from navigation projects,
and the value of power from a hydroelectric project. Primary costs include the
actual cost of constructing the project, its operation and maintenance, losses in state
and local tax revenues, and the abandonment of economically useful structures, such
as locks and bridges.
Secondary benefits have been defined as "the values added over and above the
value of the immediate products or services of the project as a result of activities
stemming from or induced by the project."' Those values "stemming from" a
project are usually thought of as accruing from the processing of the products of a
project, such as the milling, transportation, and baking of wheat produced on an
irrigation project. Thus,-the value of bread over and above the value of its wheat
content would be a secondary benefit. Values "induced by" a project include the
increase in economic activity resulting from expenditures by the producers of the
immediate products of a project. These would include the increased income of local
businesses that serve the project area. Secondary costs comprise the costs of further
processing the immediate products or services of the project and the costs incurred
by local businessmen in meeting the increased demand for goods and services in the
project area. As a matter of convenience, it is customary to speak of net secondary
benefits, which are equal to secondary benefits less secondary costs.
To the uninitiated, the calculation of a benefit-cost ratio may seem a fairly simple
matter. But economists are not entirely agreed as to either the principles or the details
of practice; and the agencies, driven by competitive and political pressures to find
favorable ratios, have been unable to agree on what constitutes a benefit, how its
monetary value should be determined, what amortization period should be used
for structures, what interest rates should be considered applicable in financing, and
whether or not net secondary benefits may legitimately be counted during periods of
full employment. For more than a decade, the agencies, primarily through the Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee and its successors, have wrestled with these
issues without reaching agreement. In 1952, Circular No. A-47, issued by the Bureau
of the Budget, imposed a degree of uniformity of method on the agencies but left
a number of questions unsettled, including the problem of secondary benefits.
Despite the complexities and unsettled problems of benefit-cost analysis, however,
its ultimate objective should be kept in mind. This, in the words of the Subcommittee on Benefits and Costs, is to"
•.. ascertain the extent to which the use of economic resources such as the land, labor, and
materials necessary for a project is more or less effective than would be the case if the
project were not undertaken.
10
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When properly used, it should result in a rank order of projects based Qn theirrelative efficiency in the use of economic resources. Benefit-cost analysis is, thus,
a major aid to budgeting, in the sense that it facilitates the comparison of alternatives
and creates an environment in which choices can be made explicitly and deliberately.
Potentially, at least, it has much to contribute to a science of rational social choice.
III
RECLAMATION REPAYMENT
AND THE TEST OF FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY

As we have seen, the early settlers on federal irrigation projects were unable to
meet their repayment obligations in the periods of time specified in law. Accordingly,
the repayment period was extended from ten years in 1902, to twenty years in 1914,
to forty years in 1926, and finally to fifty years in 1939. Despite these extensions in
general law, it has frequently been necessary for Congress (i) to make nonreimbursable a portion of the construction costs of some projects, (2) to write off
construction charges the settlers are unable to repay, and (3)to extend the repayment
period beyond the fifty-year standard set in the Reclamation Project Act of 1939.
The sums involved in the first two categories are difficult to determine from bureau
figures but are not large in terms of the total program. Settlers on a majority of the
projects which have been in existence for some time, however, have, at one time or
another, been unable to meet their repayment obligations, and Congress has found
it necessary to extend the repayment period. Such action has the effect of increasing
the subsidy to irrigation, since the federal government must continue to pay interest
on the unpaid balance. Over a fifty-year period, at three per cent interest, the interest
subsidy borne by the Government is approximately equal to the construction costs.
When the repayment period is extended beyond fifty years, the subsidy becomes proportionately greater.
Because of the way in which reclamation repayment figures are published, it is
2
However,
difficult to determine precisely the repayment histories of many projects.
had rewhich
projects
twenty-seven
of
record
the
repayment
of
Joss has made a study
ceived water by 1918.'3 His study carried these projects through 1938. Of the
projects he analyzed, five have been abandoned as having no hope of paying out and
as likely to represent a continuing loss to the Government. Of the remaining projects,
four will require more than 25o years to pay out, five will require between 125 and
250 years, six will require seventy-five to 125 years, and the remaining seven projects
will pay out in less than seventy-five years, based on their repayment experience between i918 and 1938.
More recently, a study by the Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs revealed that in the five years
between 1947 and 1952, repayment contracts of eighteen projects were amended to
" See U. S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPAYMENT HISTORIES AND PAYOUT
SCHEDULF-S-1952 0953).
2"Toss, Repayment Experience on Federal Reclamation Projects, 27 J. FAM ECON. 153 (1945).
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extend the total length of the repayment period. 4 Six of these projects will now
require periods in excess of 1oo years to pay out. Two additional projects will not
return capital costs to the Government within their useful lives. One of these would
require 328 years to pay out, if the project works were to last that long. The remaining ten projects are expected to pay out in from fifty to ninety-nine years.
Since the Bureau had constructed only seventy-one projects by 1952, and since a
number of these were, at that time, of such recent origin that repayment obligations
had not fallen due, the conclusion seems inescapable that the test of financial feasibility is not serving its purpose. In actual fact, most of the projects with repayment
histories of ten years or longer have needed some form of deferment or relief from
0
repayment obligations.'
Despite the failure of reclamation projects to pay out as expected, the program
has numerous supporters in and out of Congress, many of whom use economic arguments of dubious validity in defense of the program. Thus, the point is often made
that nearly all projects are current in their repayment obligations. But such statements conveniently ignore the fact that delinquencies are periodically funded and,
through an amendatory contract, result in an extension of the repayment period.
The depressing fact rather is that in terms of their original contracts, most of the
projects with a substantial repayment history are not current in their repayment obligations.
The defenders of the program also lay much stress on the argument that capital
costs are repaid to the Government. While this is more or less true in fact, the great
care with which these same advocates avoid any mention of the size of the interest
subsidy-now more than fifty per cent of project costs-leads one to believe that they
are less than candid with their audiences. However, it should be kept in mind that
repayment on the part of irrigation beneficiaries is considerably greater than that of
the beneficiaries of navigation and flood-control projects, the capital costs of which
are borne almost wholly by the federal government. But despite this reservation, it
seems clear that the test of financial feasibility serves more as window-dressing for the
program than as a real test which proposed projects are expected to meet. No
"'Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, Construction Costs and Repayment on Federal Reclamation Projects, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952),
"5Many of the projects completed in recent years or still under construction have brighter repayment
prospects. This is because the capital costs of these irrigation projects, through devices such as the "interest component" and the "basin account"-will be repaid from the "surplus" revenues of hydroelectric
projects. The Upper Colorado River Storage Project is a good example of a project made financially
feasible only because power consumers will repay a substantial portion of the irrigation costs. Roy Huffman, in his Irrigation Development and Public Water Policy (1953), at p. 174, says: "Obviously, the
basin account would discriminate in favor of irrigation development in river basins with great hydroelectric power resources. Specifically, it would make possible in one river basin (such as the Columbia)
the development of irrigated lands which were inferior to lands in another river basin where the lesser
power resources did not provide sufficient subsidy. Rather than aiding the expansion of public irrigation development throughout the West, the basin account system might tend to limit it to regions possessing
great quantities of hydroelectric power." It can be argued, on the other hand, however, that the power
subsidy to irrigation is a means of securing repayment aid from the secondary beneficiaries of irrigation
projects. Nevertheless, we might be. better off to pass up the hopelessly inefficient irrigation projects
and concentrate on straightforward power projects, with or without flood storage.
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doubt, it also serves a useful function as a means of comparing alternative projects,

since the inflation of expectations has no harmful effect provided the degree of optimism does not vary among projects. But as a measure of whether a project should
be constructed or the money be allowed to remain in private hands, the test does little
more than throw a cloak of respectability around the program. If the projects are
justified by a comparison of benefits and costs, then the test of financial feasibility
might well be abandoned. Or if the public interest in irrigation justified public assumption of the interest charges for more than fifty years (resulting in a subsidy
in excess of fifty per cent of the total cost of the project), Congress might appropriately change the standard to provide for a longer repayment period. But Congress
has never been willing to do this, and one is led to conclude that the program receives
its backing more from the political strength of its supporters than from any widespread feeling that its contribution to the public interest justifies a repayment period
in excess of fifty years.

IV
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS: ITS USE AND ABUSE

The second form of economic evaluation, benefit-cost analysis, is used by all three
construction agencies. In this respect, it is unlike the test of financial feasibility,
which is used only by the Bureau of Reclamation. As indicated above, economists
are by no means in complete agreement on the details of benefit-cost methodology.
But operationally useful definitions and approximations make it an effective tool of
economic evaluation when properly employed. Unfortunately, its actual use by construction agencies raises grave doubts as to the reliability of the ratios that are calculated for the use of decision-makers. In this regard, two matters must be considered. The first concerns the legitimacy of counting secondary benefits, and the
second has to do with the overestimation of primary benefits.
It will be recalled that secondary benefits are defined as the values added over
and above the value of the immediate products or services of the project as a result
of activities stemming from or induced by the project. These secondary benefits arise
from the increase in economic activity accruing from the processing of the products
of a project and the expenditures of the primary beneficiaries of the project. Secondary benefits, however, should be net of the costs incurred in secondary activities and
should also be net of any surplusesin secondary activities that would be expected from
other uses of project resources. In economic evaluation, the agencies have agreed

to assume an expanding economy and the prevalence of relatively high levels of
resource employment (i.e., full employment). These assumptions have generally
been consistent with the facts during the years in which benefit-cost analysis has
been employed. Under these conditions, it must be assumed that alternative opportunities exist for the use of project resources and that these uses would produce
secondary benefits. From a national standpoint, it can be argued that the secondary
benefits of one project are approximately equal in value to the secondary benefits
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that would arise if project resources were used in an alternative investment else-

where, whether public or private. Therefore, on the assumption that the resources
would be used elsewhere, there would be no net secondary benefits attributable to a
project. Or, to word it somewhat differently, from a national standpoint, secondary
benefits are approximately offset by secondary costs, if the latter include foregone
opportunities to reap secondary benefits from public or private investments in other
localities.
Two additional points, however, remain to be made. The first is that economists
are generally agreed that water development projects have important net secondary
benefits during periods of unemployment. Under depression conditions, alternative
private investments would not necessarily be made, and, hence, there is no basis for
insisting that the secondary benefits of a public project be reduced by the amount of
secondary benefits that would accrue from a marginal alternative investment elsewhere.
The second point which needs to be made is that the analysis of secondary benefits
presented above reflects a national point of view. Net secondary benefits, even in
periods of full employment, do exist for regions and localities. If, for some reason,
policy-makers wish to alter the pattern of income among regions, among industrial
or occupational groups, or among individuals, the counting of at least certain types
of secondary benefits becomes legitimate. Projects of this sort may not increase the
real national income, but they can achieve a variety of social objectives. Needless to

say, explicit statements of social objectives of this sort are seldom forthcoming from
policy-makers, and in their absence, except under circumstances of unrmployment,
the counting of secondary benefits does not seem justified.
Of the three agencies under consideration here, only the Bureau of Reclamation
counts secondary benefits in such a way that they play an important role in securing
favorable benefit-cost ratios. The other agencies either do not compute them or
ordinarily do so in such a limited way that their methods are not subject to criticism.

The differences between the agencies on this matter lie at the heart of most of their
disagreements on benefit-cost analysis. Although the Bureau has consistently stood
alone in the secondary benefits debates of the Federal Inter-Agency River Basin
Committee, its position is clearly dictated by the fact that most irrigation projects
depend upon the counting of "secondaries" for favorable ratios. Indeed, in the
justification of many projects, the Bureau depends more heavily upon secondary
than upon primary benefits.
The agencies' disagreements are reflected in the report of the Subcommittee on
Benefits and. Costs and, at one time, were referred to a Panel of Consultants by the
Bureau of Reclamation. ' In 1952, the dispute over secondary benefits was reviewed
by a congressional committee (commonly known as the Jones Subcommittee), which
made the following comments :"7
10 PANEL

OF CONSULTANTS ON SECONDARY OR INDIRECT BENEFITS OF

MICHAEL W. STRAUS, COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (1952).
17 House Committee on Public Works, supra note 9, at 5z.
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Some of the effort to place monetary values on indirect [secondary] benefits is nothing
short of ludicrous. It is time to stop using money and manpower on these refinements that
serve only an expedient, self-deception....
It is the view of the subcommittee that even though those devising these computations
may not realize their vulnerability, the higher authorities of the agencies who knowingly
approve the use of such dubious factors seem to be deliberately participating in an attempt
to mislead themselves if not the Congress and the public at large. The use of such
hypothecated benefits in a computation would tend to create doubt in the validity of the
entire presentation of the agency.
More recently, Professor Wantrup, who has devoted as much time as anyone
to studying the economic evaluation of water development projects, supported the
Subcommittee when he wrote: "When one tries to draw conclusions from this
analysis of secondary benefits and costs, one is forced to suggest that all classes of
secondary net benefits be dropped from consideration.... 8
Although the counting of secondary benefits is frowned upon by most of the
agencies and most economists, this fact has not restrained the Bureau's supporters
from using a popular variation of the secondary benefits thesis, perhaps best described
as the "pebble-in-the-pond" argument. According to this argument, irrigation projects
are justified because of their far-reaching economic effects, which, like the ripples
caused by throwing a pebble in a pond, spread out in concentric circles far beyond
the immediate project area. This thesis was well stated by Senator Watkins in
1955, when he argued that the Upper Colorado River Storage Project was justified
because "it will provide a great increase in homes, jobs, national income tax, and
individual contentment, as well as provide a second line of civil and military defense
for the nation as a whole."' 9 What the Bureau's friends forget is that another pebble
thrown into another pond would quite probably create just as many "secondary"
and "intangible" ripples.
Although the Corps of Engineers and the Department of Agriculture have taken
a pious position with regard to secondary benefits, recent evidence seems to suggest
that these agencies have devised less conspicuous means of accomplishing the same
end. This evidence leads to a consideration of our second major problem-namely,
the apparent overestimation of primary benefits. The opportunities for this kind of
maneuver become apparent when one reflects upon the kinds of estimates and
projections which necessarily are incorporated into benefit-cost ratios. Such factors
as crop yields, cost of production, and prices of agricultural products which would be
produced on lands in proposed irrigation, flood-control, and watershed projects are,
of course, not present facts, and estimates of these quantities are notoriously subject
to wide margins of error. Much the same can be said of estimates of the kinds and
quantities of materials which would be transported by water as a result of the construction of a navigation project. On the physical side, also, hydrologic science has
not provided firm answers for many fundamentally important questions concerning
18
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the behavior of water on and in the soil and in underground and surface reservoirs
and streams. More or less informed guesses must be resorted to, for both physical
and economic "data." This means that the door is open for various kinds of fudging,
sometimes buried deep in bulky volumes of survey reports or in agency files.
In light of these obvious temptations, it is surprising that no central staff agency
of the federal government has ever investigated the soundness of the actual field estimates of the benefits which find their way into benefit-cost ratios. The National
Resources Planning Board might have undertaken this function, but it was abolished
by Congress in 1943. It is a logical responsibility of the Bureau of the Budget, but
insufficient staff or perhaps the political repercussions of such a move may have made
it seem unwise. Why Congress has never seen fit to investigate the accuracy of
benefit-cost calculations is perhaps more apparent. In any event, it remained for the
second Hoover Commission's Task Force on Water Resources and Power to undertake such an inquiry.
An element of major significance in the evaluation of flood-control projects
is the estimation of agricultural damages from floods. Many projects are "justified" by the Corps of Engineers and the Soil Conservation Service (Department of
Agriculture) largely on the basis of claimed reductions of flood damage to agriculture
and an associated land enhancement which results from the higher economic use
to which land is put when protected from floods. Hence, the Task Force inquiry,
conducted by Professor Fred A. Clarenbach, was directed principally to securing
an answer to the question: "Are the estimates of agricultural flood damage and
of land enhancement from flood reduction [made by the two agencies] reasonable
and dependable? ' 20 The methodology of the inquiry involved an examination
of the work-sheets of the two agencies and interviews with agricultural economists,
independent appraisers, bankers, farmers, and others who are intimately acquainted
with the productivity and value of agricultural land in a small number of basins
in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas on which the agencies had recently completed
calculations of benefit-cost ratios.
I One area investigated comprised that reach of the Verdigris River, from the
Toronto Dam site downstream to the upper limit of the Neodesha Reservoir, in
southeastern Kansas. The area of cultivated land in the reach was reported by
the Corps as io,43o acres, valued at an average of $94 per acre. The Corps claims
many benefits arising from construction of the Toronto Dam, but perhaps the most
easily verified were direct crop damages and other direct damages to agriculture
(including supplies, stock and equipment, land, and improvements) which the
Corps claims will be averted if floods are checked by construction of the dam.
Corps data, based on 1949 prices, indicate that in "flood free years" the "net earning power" per acre of cultivated land is $8.28. For the same area, the Corps estimated
average annual crop damages due to floods of $6.87 per cultivated acre. Other
estimated annual (noncrop) losses to agriculture came to $0.97 per cultivated acre,
" Clarenbach, supra note 9, at 1278.

The analysis which follows is taken entirely from this report.
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making a total average annual loss of $7.84 per acre. If these corps figures are
accurate, these flood losses leave a residual net return to cultivated land of only
$o44 per acre. At a capitalization rate of five per cent, this annual return of $o44
would justify a land value of only $9 per acre. Nevertheless, actual land values, as
noted, are approximately $94 per acre.
The most reasonable explanation for the evident inconsistency in the Corps's
appraisal results would seem to be that direct flood damages were significantly
overestimated. Clarenbach's interviews with farmers, professional hydrologists,
and agricultural economists seemed to indicate that "the Corps does not take adequate account of what some informants considered were important net beneficial
effects of some floods in improving moisture and soil conditions." ' ' Some farmers
stated candidly that they did not get a good crop unless their lowlands were inundated during the spring.
Clarenbach also investigated the work of the Soil Conservation Service above
Lavon Reservoir on the East Fork of the Trinity River in northwest Texas. In this
area, the SCS is engaged in a program of installing runoff and waterflow retardation structures and soil-erosion prevention measures. On the basis of 14,343 acres
subject to flooding, the SCS estimates an average annual direct damage to crops
and pasture of $34.98 per acre. Yet the net residual return to flood-free bottom
land averages only about $18 per acre per year, after the deduction of production
costs, taxes, and incidental maintenance charges. What the SCS is saying is that
the farmers in this area annually lose more from flood damages than their land can
produce even in a flood-free year! This is simply not believable. As Clarenbach
says: "Though farmers are not perfect economic calculators, neither are they economic imbeciles."22
The analyses summarized above deal only with estimates of direct flood damages to crops and pasture. Both the Corps and SCS claim additional large benefits for indirect damages and for land enhancement. Clarenbach found these estimated benefits subject to equal or greater inflation. Hence, it is clear why Clarenbach refers to the economic evaluations now conducted by the agencies as a "considerable accumulation of absurdities," 23 why the Jones Subcommittee holds that
benefit-cost analysis serves "only an expedient self-deception," 24 and why Wantrup
-more given to scholarly understatement-says that "benefit-cost analysis can be
and has been distorted and abused. ' 3
The misuse to which benefit-cost analysis has been put must now be regarded
as a matter of common knowledge among decision-makers high in the depart26 Not only has
ments, in the Executive Office of the President, and in Congress.
2'%d. at 1298.
"2Id.at i29o.
"Id. at 1283.
' House Committee on Public Works, supra note 9, at 51.
"' Wantrup, supra note 9, at 676.
.oThe examples cited in the foregoing paragraphs deal with the overestimation of flood-control benefits.
For analyses of navigation projects, see Curran, supra note 9, and Missousu BASIN SURVEY COMM'N,
While the Corps of Engineers claimed $ix,795,ooo annually as
MissoURI: LAND AND WATER (953).
benefits from erosion control along the Missouri, the Missouri Basin Survey Commission estimated these
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the corruption of economic evaluation been noted by scholars, but the bureaucratic
struggles of the great construction agencies have led to a series of reciprocal indictments which have laid the record open for all who care to look. Yet, the
political pressures are such that serious interest in the reform of economic evaluation is conspicuous for its absence.
As presently used, benefit-cost analysis constitutes a clear and present danger
because of the great influence which favorable ratios carry. In a culture such as
ours, influenced as it is by the semantics of a market economy, it becomes near
heresy to oppose an investment which, we are assured, will yield a sizable return.
The idea of investment and return, neatly packaged in the form of a ratio incorporating only factors having a market value, has such a powerful command
over the imagination that one can only credit the agencies with a master stroke in
their adoption of this technique for the justification and defense of their programs.
Again, as with the test of financial feasibility, there is little correspondence between what men know and what they say. Although many congressmen and certainly most agency decision-makers are aware of the debasement of benefit-cost
analysis, the survey reports are full of them, and in their speeches, congressmen
assure their colleagues that the nation cannot afford to forego the opportunity to
make investments which will yield an excess of returns.
Another problem created by the heavy dependence upon benefit-cost analysis
is the subordination of intangible benefits and costs in economic evaluation.
These, it will be recalled, are benefits and costs which are not readily reduced to
monetary equivalents. Often they are referred to as extramarket values. By whatever name they are called, they are real and often of great significance; and nearly
all economists agree that they should be considered in project evaluation. In-

cluded among the intangibles are scenic and recreational values (including wildlife), the saving of human life through flood control, strengthening the national
security, and the encouragement of a more widely-dispersed industry. The importance of these values will be appraised quite differently by different individuals,
but that does not lessen their significance nor warrant their being ignored in project
evaluation. The usual suggestion is that these values be outlined and evaluated
in prose form. Yet, experience shows that agencies are unwilling to recommend
projects with unfavorable ratios, even when a strong case can be made for them
on the basis of intangible benefits. Perhaps this dilemma need never arise, because of the ease with which favorable ratios can be manufactured. But it seems
partly, at least, to be a product of our dependence upon the symbols of the business
world, and to this extent, the emphasis which the agencies and Congress place
upon benefit-cost ratios detracts from the consideration which important extramarket values might otherwise receive.
at $964,000. Annual savings due to the navigation project the Corps estimated at $6,699,ooo, while the
Commission estimated them at $2,050,000. For the navigation project as a whole, the Corps calculated
a benefit-cost ratio of 1.9 to x; the Commission arrived at a ratio of o.8 to x.
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V
EXTRAMARKET VALUES: CLOAK FOR SELF-INTEREST?

It is a characteristic of politics that self-interest often masquerades in the form
of lofty principle, for only in this fashion can it achieve the widespread public
support which it needs. Thus, Locke took pen in hand after the Glorious Revolution to provide a theoretical defense for what had taken place, and the American
Revolution was ably justified by Paine, Jefferson, and others using arguments
which perhaps had comparatively little to do with the real issues of the controversy.
Much the same can be said of many arguments offered in justification of river
basin projects.
Clearly, many supporters of water development projects come to their position
because of the important intangible public benefits provided by such projects. The
preservation of lives through flood control and the enhancement of scenic and
recreational values are perhaps the most unchallengable of these. But other
justifications are set forth which inevitably lead the observer to wonder how sincerely they are offered and to what extent they are used to cloak objectives of
more immediate self-interest. This concern becomes all the more important when
one realizes the huge stake which contractors, navigation interests, shippers, landowners, and others have in the enormous subsidies provided through water development projects. In this part, we shall examine some of the arguments which
have been most powerful in mobilizing support behind these programs. Because
of the writer's familiarity with the reclamation program, most of the illustrations
are drawn from it. Equally good examples, however, could be drawn from floodcontrol, navigation, power, and watershed-control programs.
Perhaps the most powerful force operating in support of the reclamation program has been a consistent interest on the part of our people in development of
the West. For many, this nation has had a "manifest destiny" first to push back
the frontier and then populate and develop the West. This has been America's
challenge, and one generation after another has had its imagination captured by
the romance of subjecting western lands and water to human control. From
Horace Greeley's "Go West, Young Man" to the recent Davy Crockett craze,
America's fascination with the West has remained undiminished.
Much of the interest in irrigation in the West has been stimulated by outright
promoters. One of the most influential of these was William E. Smythe, who wrote
The Conquest of Arid America (1899), which included chapters entitled "Greatness by Continental Conquest," "The Better Half of the United States," "The
Blessing of Aridity," and "The Miracle of Irrigation." From Smythe's day to
present times, the West has had its advocates. Thus, Clarence Davis, while Under
Secretary of the Department of the Interior, told an audience :17
" Speech before the Idaho State Reclamation Association, Idaho Falls, Idaho, April 25, 1955. Interior
Dcpartment News Release, April 25, 1955.
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It is a great program to which the Bureau of Reclamation was originally dedicatedthe development of the land and water resources of the West. We should revise our thinking. We should look at those things which are of fundamental importance. We should
strive to build the West.
The logical conclusion to much of this kind of promotional argument is the
doctrine that the West has a right to be developed, even though alternative investments elsewhere would add more to the real national income. This is the official
position of the Department of the Interior. Writing in criticism of a Bureau of
the Budget directive which provided that projects should be evaluated, in part,
on the relative economy of alternative means available on a national basis for meeting the needs to be met by the project, Ralph Tudor, while Acting Secretary of
the Interior, said:2
The Reclamation program is basically a Western States land and water resource development program.... In an Interior report there is no occasion for comparing the relative
merits of a proposed Federal irrigation development with some other reclamation possibilities, such as draining of swamp lands. The basic test should be: (i) whether a proposed development is needed and is favorable from an economic standpoint; and (2) its
relationship to a balanced over-all national program. With respect to test (2), State and
iegional needs ... may outweigh considerations resulting from strict economic evaluation
on a national basis. This element of balanced development . . . may be disregarded if
emphasis is placed on nation-wide competition of alternatives.
Thus, we have the view that "balanced development" requires that regions
be developed more or less equally, or on some other "fair" basis, even though
Oternative investments in other regions-perhaps already more highly developed
-might contribute more to the real national income. Promoters and those with
vested interests to defend are not always alone in this point of view. The growth
of regionalism as a concept and as an aia to analysis in economics, sociology,
geography, and political science has perhaps caused some scholars to hold regional
values higher than national ones 9 Thus, William E. Folz criticizes Wantrup
for failing to "consider as a benefit the psychological value society derives from
the development of a region."3 Points of view such as this raise serious philosophical and economic questions, which, needless to say, merit the most careful
attention. Clearly, one cannot satisfy such "psychological values," if they really
exist, and, at the same time, maximize the economic returns from either public
or private investment. Inevitably, one is led to ask whether those who defend
"8From a memorandum entitled "Comments and Recommendations for Revision of Bureau of the
Budget Circular No. A- 4 7," attached to z, letter from Ralph A. Tudor, Acting Sceretary of the Interior,
to Joseph M. Dodge, Director, Bureau of the Budget, Jan. 14, 1954.
2 For a discussion of the role which regional analysis can play in each of the social sciences, see
Garnsey, The Dimensions of Regional Science, in 2 PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF 'IE REOIONAL SCIENCE
AssocIATIoN 27 (1956).'
"0 In Water Resources and Economic Development of the West: Benefit-Cost Analysis, a paper presented at the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Dec. 27, 1954, Berkeley, Cal.
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regional values are not really interested primarily in the development of their own
region.
A second justification of the reclamation program is that it creates farm homes
and their dependent, small urban communities. In the Bureau's publications,
these values are referred to as settlement opportunities. There is little doubt that
the Reclamation Act of 19o2 was regarded as a home and community-building
measure. The i6o-acre limitation of federal reclamation law, reiterated in legislation more than a dozen times in forty years, 3 ' is clearly designed to promote the
creation of family-size farms. This goal was and still is regarded by many as
important enough to justify heavy subsidy to the irrigation program.
This justification of the reclamation program has its roots in a romantic attachment to an earlier day-to farming as a stable, sound way of life which is worth
preserving in a world of uncertainties, radical ideologies, and unsettling social
changes. Much of the writing in defense of the irrigation program is antiurban
in outlook. Thus, an important Interior official recently said:32
There are millions of acres of underdeveloped land in the West .... much of which
can be the scene of comfortable farms, of thriving communities and a much happier
life for many of our people than they can lead in the congested industrial centers and big
cities of other parts of the country.
And an Interior publication, justifying the Missouri Basin Project, says of irrigated
areas 33
They will provide a land-use situation that will help stem the present tide of urbanization by throwing out into the area a series of life-lines, which will help hold a stabilization
line below which the proportion of rural population in the area may be kept from falling.
Thus, much of the writing in defense of the irrigation program appeals to a lingering dissatisfaction which the urban majorities of the East have in their mode of
living and capitalizes on a romantic attachment which nearly all Americans have
to farming as a way of life.
A closely related objective of the reclamation program is the stabilization- of
human occupancy of the Great Plains. Because of extreme variations in the amount
and distribution of rainfall, farming and ranching on the plains have always
been hazardous undertakings. The inevitable problems of wresting a living from
the soil under the conditions prevailing on the plains was complicated historically
by the fact that the men and women who peopled the West brought with them a
background of experience in lands of greater humidity and tried to impose their
ways of farming on this new land. The result has been an unstable agriculture
and, at times, the emergence of problems of truly national concern-as illustrated
by the dust bowl of the I93O's and the current distress in the drought-stricken
Southwest.
31 See U. S. BUREAU OF RECLAMTION, op. cit. supra note 4, at 29.

" Clarence A. Davis, Under Secretary- of the Department of the Interior, Release, supra note 27.
"5Ickes, Missouri River Basin, S. Doc. No. z91, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1944) (emphasis supplied).
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An important defense of the irrigation program in the Missouri basin, where

project beneficiaries are able to repay only a small fraction of capital costs, is based
on this concept of "stabilization."

Thus, one of the authorizing documents for

the Missouri Basin Project states:
There is not enough water in the Missouri River to irrigate the entire basin, but there
is enough to create hundreds of islands of safety, some stretched like necklaces of narrow
ribbons along streams in the basin; some larger blocks created by the diversion of available
waters to irrigable areas.

These "islands of safety" are expected to provide a safe type of agriculture for
the families living on them, supplementary feed and forage for adjacent dry-land
farmers (thus reducing the need to liquidate valuable livestock during drought
years), and a steady flow of high-value agricultural products, the processing of
which will provide employment in the area, even during years of deficient rainfall.
The "stabilization" argument is sometimes extended to include the "rescue of
stranded areas." This was the avowed objective of the Central Arizona Project,"0
which was never authorized by Congress. This project was designed to bring
water to 150,oo acres of land which had only insecurely been brought under
cultivation in the first place. The project would have cost more than a billion
dollars, none of which could have been repaid by the farmers. While this project
never secured congressional approval, it differs only in degree from numerous
others in the Missouri basin.
Many other arguments are, of course, also offered in justification of the reclamation program. Some, like the argument that projects result in an increase in
federal income taxes, are only variations of the secondary-benefits argument and
have no validity during periods of full employment, since alternative investments
would produce the same effects. Others in this category include the arguments
that projects provide "additional employment opportunities" and provide "new
wealth where none existed before."
Our interest in these extramarket values stems from a concern about their
validity. Social scientists are presented here with a difficult question: Do Americans "really" wish to develop the West, create settlement opportunities on new
farms, or stabilize agriculture on the Great Plains, despite the fact that these
ventures are often uneconomic in the sense that their benefit-cost ratios, if legitimately calculated, would be less than unity? Or are these justifications merely
designed to cloak the desire for subsidy, windfall gains, or other forms of economic
advantage which are an inevitable accompaniment of these projects?
We know that powerful economic interests have much to gain from water
development projects. The irrigation and watershed programs are heavily subsidized, and navigation and flood control beneficiaries return no part of the capital
"Id. at 144.
" See U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, Dep't of the Interior, A Report and Findings on Central 4tizona
Project, H. R. Doc. No. 136, 81st Cong., xst Sess. (1949).
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costs to the federal treasury. And we know that the ecoriomic interests which
benefit from these projects are well-organized. According to Huffman, the National Reclamation Association "is made up primarily of the representatives of
chambers of commerce, agricultural development departments of railroads, real
estate agencies, and promotional groups in general," and membership in the
National Rivers and Harbors Congress "is heavily weighted with representatives
of the construction industry and allied businesses-people whose future depends on
the type of work involved in river and harbor improvements.""6 We know also
that the roughly 50,000 employees of the three agencies under consideration here
constitute a huge bureaucracy with an enormous stake in the continuation and
expansion of their programs3
Unfortunately, we are dealing here with complex problems of human motivation. The human mind is sufficiently pliable that basic motives are often masked,
even from the person involved, by elaborate rationalizations. The real and the
unreal, the true and the untrue are inextricably intertwined. The depressing fact
is that the behavioral sciences have no ready means of probing motivations or of
sorting hierarchies of values to determine which are held in their own right and
which serve merely as cloaks for others. Thus, the extent to which projects enable
us to realize important extramarket values, as opposed to masked self-interest, is,
for the moment, unanswerable, at least in precise terms. In the following part,
however, we will consider means by which more attention, of a rational and
analytical sort, can be brought to bear on the problem of extramarket values.
VI
SHOULD ECONOMIC EVALUATION BE ABANDONED?

If the analysis presented in the foregoing sections is valid, economic evaluation is
failing in its purpose, which is to aid us in the rational comparison of alternatives.
The repayment requirement of reclamation law has been administered in such a way
that project beneficiaries are required to repay capital costs only to the extent of their
"ability." Since the standard is not an absolute one, despite the requirements of the
law, it loses much of its value as a measuring rod, although admittedly it may be of
some use in weeding out the least efficient projects-especially if they have comparatively little political support. Much the same has happened to benefit-cost analysis.
If our analysis is correct, this form of economic evaluation has been corrupted by
:ounting secondary benefits during periods of full employment and by the excessively
optimistic estimation of direct benefits. All the agencies seem guilty, and one
can only conclude that political pressures, interagency competition, and bureaucratic
self-interest dictate that enough favorable ratios be "found" each year to keep the
several programs going at a "desirable" level of activity.
The question must then be asked: Should economic evaluation be abandoned
'o HuFFMAN,
'7

supra note 1.,
Op. cit.

at i8o.

See de Roos and Maass, The Lobby that Can't Be Licked, Harper's Magazine, Aug. X949, p. 2x.
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because it is misleading and does more harm than good? Wantrup has asked this
question and answered it in the negative. He argues first that "economic and
pseudoeconomic arguments are by far the most important weapons in the arsenal of
opposed regional, industrial, and occupational interests contending in the political
arena for or against a public project," and that benefit-cost analysis in the hands of
the Government "serves a worth-while purpose to restrain the abuse of economi6
arguments in the political process. '3' The facts, however, point in the opposite
direction. Governmental calculations of benefits and costs cannot be used to restrain
the abuse of economic arguments, because these calculations are themselves unreliable
and misleading. In fact, it seems fair to say that government agencies contribute
nearly as much to the abuse of economic arguments as do private interests. Perhaps
the net effect of benefit-cost analysis by government agencies is to undermine public
confidence in the arguments of those who attach little weight to extramarket benefits
and hold that many projects should not be constructed because they are uneconomic.
This defense of benefit-cost analysis, then, seems untenable.
Wantrup's second defense of benefit-cost analysis is that it is worthwhile "because
of its stimulating effects in expanding scientific understanding of the physical as well
as social problems in public resource development."39 In support of this position, he
argues that the persistent quest of those who calculate benefit-cost ratios for additional
quantitative information has stimulated research in the physical problems of flood
control, reclamation, and land management. One can grant this argument, however,
without agreeing that the benefits to the physical sciences are worth the price we pay
through the misinforming of decision-makers. As for the social sciences, it is
probably true that benefit-cost analysis has focused attention on the decision-making
process and on the factors which play a role in it. The development of a small, but
growing, literature on the subject is evidence of that. But its more general and important effect is to narcotize any real public interest in project evaluation. The symbols of the market economy are so powerful in America that the public is soothed
into near unconsciousness when told by an authoritative government agency that
the returns from a project will exceed its costs.
Must our question, then, be answered in the affirmative? I think not. Fortunately, the abuse of economic evaluation by government agences does not, by itself,
lead to the construction of many projects. The political forces at work are such that
most projects would probably be authorized in any event, although the process might
be a bit more embarrassing in the absence of the appearance of respectability which
economic evaluation provides. But the positive case for economic evaluation rests
on the enormous contribution which it could make to the decision-making process
and, through it, to rational social action. Properly conducted, economic evaluation
can provide a valuable comparison of alternatives in terms of those direct benefits
and costs which can reasonably be reduced to dollar values. And if, as seems likely,
s Wantrup, supra note 9, at 677.
Id.at 678.
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many of these ratios were near or below unity, this fact would focus attention on
much of the loose justification of projects in terms of their extramarket values. One
could reasonably expect that alleged benefits such as "the psychological value society
derives from the development of a region," creating settlement opportunities, and
harnessing untamed rivers would be subjected to far more searching scrutiny by the
public and by decision-makers in particular than is the case now, when padded ratios
lull us into a false sense of security.
If the case for economic evaluation rests upon its enormous potential contribution
to rational decision-making, how can it be made to fulfill its purpose? The answer is
fortunately simple: effective control under a strong unit in the Executive Office of
the President. Such a unit must be wholly independent of the construction agencies,
and it must have the power (i) to establish standards and'procedures for economic
evaluation, and (2) to audit the working papers of agency economists and physical
scientists in the field. Human nature and political pressures being what they are,
the construction agencies cannot be trusted to produce objective economic evaluadons. Action to provide an independent check on the construction agencies could
quite probably be taken under presidential authority alone.
American political arrangements are such that most units in the Executive Office
of the President are not wholly free of political pressure. The unit suggested above
would unquestionably be even more free to pursue its assigned task if Congress were
willing to enact legislation to require that direct beneficiaries of all water development projects return a substantial share of project costs to the federal treasury. The
repayment requirements of reclamation law, to some extent, eliminate pressures for
construction of the least economic projects. The extension of a similar requirement
to navigation and flood-control law could hardly help but have a sobering influence on
those who now press for utterly uneconomic programs of water resource development.

